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JEFFERSON v. WINDY CITY MAINTENANCE, INC.
1998 WL 474115 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Jefferson v. Windy City
Maintenance, Inc., Windy City Management,
Inc. ("Windy City") oversaw housekeeping
work at McCormick Place and Navy Pier.'
The plaintiffs worked for Windy City as
janitors.2 Windy City's predecessor, MPEA,
employed five of the six named plaintiffs for
several years before the takeover These
employees all worked at McCormick Place
and Navy Pier during their employment with
MPEA and were members of Local 25 of the
Service Employees International Union.4 The
sixth named plaintiff, Kenny Bledsoe, worked
for Windy City before it took over operations
from MPEA and was not a union member.' In
June 1996, Windy City assigned him to
supervise operations at Navy Pier.6
The union-member plaintiffs alleged
several acts of racially discriminatory conduct
by defendant.7 Plaintiffs initially filed charges
with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and received notices of the right
to sue.8  One plaintiff alleged that the
defendant terminated him on the basis of a
false charge. He was later reinstated without
back pay.9 Another claimed management
'Jefferson v. Windy City Maintenance, Inc., No. 96 C







8Id. at *2 (citing 2d Am. Compl. 27.).
9Id. at *3.
assigned him an excessive workload and
terminated him for not completing the work. 0
Windy City reinstated this plaintiff but
refused to grant back pay." The next plaintiff
complained of a demotion from a low level
managerial position to janitorial duties.'
2
Defendant reinstated the plaintiff to her
managerial position and later suspended her
for fighting. 3 Plaintiff contended it was self-
defense.'4 Management also demoted another
plaintiff who then walked off the job.15
Subsequently, he was fired, then reinstated
without back pay.'6 Thereafter, management
wrote this plaintiff up several times and fired
him without giving a reason. 7 The last union-
member plaintiff alleged that she was harassed
and given demeaning janitorial work because
of her race. The final plaintiff, Kenny
Bledsoe alleged that defendant forced him to
terminate two African-American employees,
and that management used strong racial slurs
to refer to those employees) 8
In response to the above conduct,
plaintiffs accused defendant of having a past
and current policy that discriminated against
African-Americans who worked in the
Housekeeping Department at McCormick









8 Id. at *4 (It is the policy of the R.E.A.L. Journal not
to publish specific derogatory comments.)
Place and Navy Pier. 9 Their complaint
alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.20 Among
the allegations common to all plaintiffs'
claims were: defendant assigned work to
employees in a discriminatory manner,
disproportionately terminated African-
American employees, and created a hostile
work environment for African-American
employees.21  One count, which alleged
termination in retaliation for opposing
discriminatory practices, was only brought by
Kenny Bledsoe.22
As part of its takeover, Windy City
assumed MPEA's employee obligations.23
Thereafter, plaintiffs alleged that the
collective bargaining agreement between
MPEA and the plaintiffs' union obligated
Windy City to follow a "progressive
disciplinary system."'24 This system had five
steps: "(1) oral warning; (2) written warning;
(3) suspension #1; (4) suspension #2; (5)
discharge." '25  Plaintiffs claimed that the
management officials responsible for all
disciplinary actions implemented this system
'9Id. at *2 (citing 2d Am. Compl. 1).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides: "All persons within
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every state and territory to ... to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings..."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Title VII, provides: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer... to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individuals race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."
2 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474114, at *2 (citing 2d Am.
Compl. 4.).
22 Id. at *2.
23 1d. at *3.
24Id.
2 Id. at *3 (citing Pls.' Ex. F.).
26in a racially adverse manner.
The disciplinary system created two
categories of possible rules violations-
"major" and "minor."2 7 Windy City defined
major violations as "willful or deliberate
violations of company or safety rules of such
a degree that continued employment of the
individual may not be desirable, includes
excessive tardiness or absenteeism, acts that
might endanger the safety of others, fighting
on company premise, and numerous other
factors."'28 These violations did not require
management to follow the progressive
system.29 Management either automatically
suspended or fired an employee causing a
major rule violation.30 The agreement defined
minor rule violations as those that "may not
appear to be of a serious nature, but cannot
and will not be tolerated if repeated."'"
Violations included loafing, failure to notify
supervisor of absence, unsatisfactory work
performance, and other items.32  The
collective bargaining agreement required
defendant to implement the progressive
discipline system for these minor violations.33
Plaintiffs alleged that management
enforced Windy City's disciplinary system in
a racially motivated manner.34  Thus,
plaintiffs petitioned the district court to
consolidate their claims against the defendant
in a class action.35 It proposed that the court
certify the following class: "all present and
26 Id. at *3 (citing Pls.' Mem. at 13).
27 Id. at *3.




32 Id. at *3 (citing Pls' Ex. F.).
33 Id.
341 Id. at *2.
31 Id. at *5.
former African-American persons employed
by defendant who have worked in the
Housekeeping Department of McCormick
Place and Navy Pier on or after June 1,
1996. "36
HOLDING
The district court held that plaintiffs
satisfied the requirements for class
certification of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)37 and 23(b)(2).38 It granted
certification of the proposed class with a slight
modification of the class definition.39  The
court certified the following class: "All
present and former African-American union-
member janitorial workers employed by
Windy City in the Housekeeping Department
of McCormick Place and Navy Pier on or after
June 1, 1996."40
ANALYSIS
The question before the district court
was whether the Rule 23 certification
requirements were met.4' In order for a class
to qualify for certification, Federal Rule of
36 Id. at *1.
37 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). "One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class."
38 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). "[T]he party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class a whole." See also
Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *1.
39 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *1.
4 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *10.
411d. at *1 (citing Am. Compl. 12.).
Civil Procedure 23 requires that plaintiffs
satisfy all the conditions of subsection (a) and,
in addition, plaintiffs must fulfill one of the
elements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b).42 When certification issues arise, the
court should focus on whether the certification
requirements of the two subsections are
satisfied rather than consider the merits of the
case.43  Thus, the court only determines
whether the plaintiffs assert a claim that
would satisfy the requirements of Rule 23.
44
Policy considerations necessitate that the court
should certify the class in borderline
situations.45
A. Rule 23(a)
The district court discussed the four
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a):
42 See Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago,
7 F.3d 584, 596 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Harriston v.
Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 703 (7th Cir.
1993)); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 565
F.2d 975, 977 (7th Cir. 1977).
43 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178
(1974) (Rule 23 does not "give [] a court any authority
to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a
suit to determine whether it may be maintained as a
class action.").
" The court assumed all of the allegations in the
complaint were true. See Johns v. DeLeonardis, 145
F.R.D. 480, 482 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("For the purposes of
a motion to certify a class, we do not reach the merits
of the claim or weigh evidence. Rather, we must take
the allegations of the complaint as true"). See H.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 24.13 at
60 (3d ed. 1992). (Some situations will require that the
court still decide a factual or legal issue of the
plaintiffs' cause of action. For instance, when
conclusory allegations mustbe replaced with a showing
of underlying facts which would support, prima facie,
a showing that the case is appropriate for class action.)
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469
(1978).
45 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at * 2 ("[Courts] should
err in favor of maintaining class actions"). See King v.
Kansas City S. Indus., 519 F.2d 20, 26 (7th Cir. 1975)
(favoring maintenance of class actions).
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation.46
1. Numerosity
Rule 23(a) requires that "the class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable."'47 Because the defendant did
not dispute numerosity and employed more
than two hundred African-Americans during
the alleged violation period, the court held that
plaintiffs' claims fulfilled this requirement of
the rule.48 The court did not extensively
analyze the facts before making this
numerosity ruling, but the court thoroughly
examined every other component of 23(a).
2. Commonality
According to Rule 23(a)(2), in order to
satisfy the commonality requirement, the class
members must have at least one question of
law or fact in common.4 9 In determining
whether the plaintiffs had a question of law or
fact in common the district court first looked
to precedent. The Seventh Circuit held that a
"common nucleus of operative facts" is
sufficient to uphold class certification."
However, the United States Supreme Court
has held that the fact that a person is a
member of an identifiable class is not a valid
reason for the person to litigate all possible
discrimination claims on the class' behalf.51
However, the Court also held that if an
46 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *5.
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
48 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *5.
49 Id. See also Whitehall Convalescent and Nursing
Home, 164 F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. Ill 1996); Franklin
v. City of Chicago, 102 F.R.D. 944, 949 (N.D. Ill
1984).
" Rosario v. Lividitis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1051 (1993).
"' General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 146, 159 n.15
(1982).
employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination manifested in hiring or
promotion practices, then both applicants and
employees qualified under the same class.
52
The district court held it should inquire
about "whether the plaintiffs suffered injury
from a specific discriminatory practice of the
employer in the same manner as the members
of the proposed class." 3 The court held that
plaintiffs alleged more than just a common
race or employer.54 The common legal and
factual issues raised by the plaintiffs were
whether defendant's disciplinary system
discriminated against African-American
employees under a disparate impact or
disparate treatment theory.55 Furthermore, all
plaintiffs claimed defendant implemented the
disciplinary system in a discriminatory
manner, and that defendant violated Title VII
and section 1981. The court held that when a
complaint alleges that all plaintiffs were
subjected to the defendant's discriminatory
practice, the commonality requirement has
been met.
The court discounted defendant's
argument that Patterson v. General Motors
Corporation6 required the denial of class
certification based on lack of commonality. 7
Patterson involved an individual employee
who claimed discrimination by his employer
and alleged classwide discrimination without
substantiating any "factual allegations of
classwide discrimination."58 The district court
distinguished Patterson because the plaintiffs
52 Id. at 159 n.15.
53 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *6.
54Id.
55 Id.
56 Patterson v. G.M. Corp., 631 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1980).
57 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *7.
58 Patterson, 631 F.2d at 480.
in the present case substantiated factual
allegations of classwide discrimination by
alleging "systematic discrimination" and
supporting it with evidence.59 The court also
focused on statistical evidence of disparate
treatment between African-American and
other employees.6" It held that plaintiffs
"alleged a specific policy and practice of
discrimination with regard to implementation
of the disciplinary system" which is beyond
mere allegations of commonality based on
sharing the same employer and being a
member of the same race. 61  The court
compared this situation to the one in
Hispanics United ofDupage County v. Village
ofAddison62 which held that, "[w]here 'broad
discriminatory policies and practice constitute
the gravamen of a class suit, common
questions of law or fact are necessarily
presented. ",63
Defendant argued that plaintiffs mis-
represented the facts about the centralization
of the disciplinary process and its application
to all employees.64 The court disagreed. It
found that defendant's own affidavits
indicated that low level managers could not
discipline without permission from upper
level management. 6' The court also used
these affidavits to find that the disciplinary
system was enforced by five managers.66
Indeed, the court decided that it should not
delve into these types of facts too deeply
'9 Id. at *7.
60 Id.
63 Id. at *6.
62 160 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
63 Id. at 688 (quoting Midwest Community Council v.
Chicago Park Dist., 87 F.R.D. 457, 460 (N.D. Ill.
1980)).
( Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *7.
65 Id.
66 Id. at *7.
while determining a Rule 23 motion, but that
it should focus on the plaintiffs' allegations. 67
However, the court was persuaded by
defendant's argument that the progressive
disciplinary system only applied to union-
member janitorial employees. 68 Because the
plaintiffs acknowledged that managers were
not union members, and therefore, not subject
to the progressive disciplinary system, the
court found that Kenny Bledsoe could not
directly be affected by the policy.69 The court
held that Bledsoe was not affected by the
program in the same manner as the other
plaintiffs. 70  He might have felt just as
uncomfortable as non-African-American
managers who were required to implement the
discriminatory program, but this did not
accord him commonality with the rest of the
proposed class. To maintain commonality,
the court modified the proposed class
definition to exclude managers while
including union member janitorial
employees.7 1
3. Typicality
Typicality requires that the named
plaintiffs' claims are typical of the whole class
ofplaintiffs.72 It is related to the commonality
requirement.73 Commonality requires that
there be at least one issue common to all
members while typicality "requires the named
plaintiffs' claims to be typical of the class." 74
However, plaintiffs need not present the same
67 Id. at *7 n.5 See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.




72 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
73 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13 ("The commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.").
74Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *5, *8.
factual circumstances. 75
Defendant argued that each claim must
be analyzed individually. In other words,
defendant contended that plaintiffs' claims
were "uniquely personal" because each
plaintiff was discharged for different
reasons.76 In response, the court cited De La
Fuente v. Stokely- Van Camp, Inc.,7 7 to support
its finding that the claims must only "have the
same essential characteristics as the claims of
the class at large. '78 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs fulfilled the typicality
prerequisite because the plaintiffs' claims
"have the same essential characteristics as the
claims of the class at large."79
4. Adequacy of Representation
The named plaintiffs must adequately
protect and furnish fair representation of the
interests of the entire class.80  The courts
analyzed this requirement by examining two
factors: "(1) the adequacy of the named
plaintiffs' counsel and (2) whether the named
plaintiffs had interests antagonistic to those of
the class." 81 Defendant did not dispute the
adequacy of counsel but attacked whether the
named plaintiffs were adequate
representatives of the class.82 It reasoned that
the class representatives included union
members as well as non-union/management
employees, and some of the plaintiffs were
full-time while others were part-time.83
Defendant claimed that the disparity in the
types of employees that were to serve as class
representatives was per se inadequate
representation.
Because defendant offered no evidence
that part-time employees were non-union
members,84  the court included these
individuals in the class. But, as the court
already ruled, non-union members, like Kenny
Bledsoe, were excluded from the definition of
the class."
The defendant also argued that because
another named plaintiff disciplined those she
supervised, she was not an adequate
representative either.86 The court noted the
tension that might occur, but decided the
alleged personal discrimination to the
supervisor plaintiff was enough to overcome
the tension.87 Therefore, the supervisor
plaintiff remained a member of the class.
Another argument by the defendant was that it
only discharged one of the plaintiffs by the
progressive disciplinary system.88 The court
concluded that even if this was true, it did not
rebut plaintiffs' allegations of discriminatory
disciplining action.89
Defendant's final argument against
representation attacked the credibility and
honesty of the named plaintiffs. Defendant
specifically alleged that a named plaintiff
testified during her deposition that she was not
currently employed, but evidence existed to
Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45, 54 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
76Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *8.
77 713 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983).
78 Id. at 232.
71 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *8 (citing De La
Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232).
80 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
81See Rosario, 963 F.2d at 1018; Secretary of Labor v.
Fizsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 697 (7th Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
82 Jefferson, 1998 WL 474115, at *8.
83 Id. at*8.
84 Id. at *6 n.8.
85 Id. at *7.
86 Id. at *9.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at *9 ("Discipline, under the defendant's policy,
includes oral warnings and suspensions as well as
termination").
the contrary.9" This same plaintiff also denied
having problems with MPEA while records
showed otherwise.9 The court responded that
"[c]ourts have found that a named plaintiff's
honesty is a relevant consideration to allowing
her to represent a class."'92 The court decided,
however, that the inconsistencies in the
plaintiffs' testimony did not contradict
plaintiffs' claims, and that other alleged
inconsistencies were insignificant.93
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)
The final requirement that the
plaintiffs must satisfy is one of the subsections
of Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs maintained that they
satisfied Rule 23(b)(2). This subsection
provided for certification if "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole."94 Cases that
seek equitable relief such as an injunction or
a declaratory judgment to class wide
discrimination are brought appropriately under
Rule 23(b)(2).95 Also, courts interpret this
subsection of the rule to mean that "the party
opposing the class must have acted in a
90 Id. at *9.
9' Id. at *9 (defendant submitted a MPEA disciplinary
reportregarding an altercationbetween theplaintiffand
a supervisor resulting in plaintiff's suspension).
"' Id. at *9 (citing Kaplan v. Pomerantz, 132 F.R.D.
504, 510 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949));
Armour v. City of Anniston, 89 F.R.D. 331,332 (N.D.
Ala. 1980).
" At best, the contradictions might impeach the
credibility of the plaintiff, but they do not directly
refute the claims of discrimination.
94 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
9' See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211,257 (5th Cir. 1974).
consistent manner toward members of the
class so that [its] action may be viewed as part
of a pattern of activity."96  However, the
policy need not affect all class members.
97
The court found that plaintiffs mainly
sought equitable relief such as a declaration
stating that defendant violated Title VII and
section 1981.9' They also requested that the
court issue an injunction requiring Windy City
to remedy these violations.99 Some members
of the potential class also could be
reinstated.' ° The court held that these types
of equitable relief fall under subsection
(b)(2).10 1 Therefore, plaintiffs satisfied the
second requirement of class certification.0 2
The court ruled that although some plaintiffs
were seeking back pay, this did not bar
certification under 23(b)(2).103
CONCLUSION
Jefferson is a thorough road-map for
practitioners who are trying to certify a class
in a discrimination class action suit. It
outlines all of the requirements of Rule 23
except numerosity. The case's biggest
contribution is that it details how to overcome
a challenge to a class' commonality. The
opinion explains that being part of an
identifiable class is not enough for
certification, but that the class must have a
"common nucleus of operative facts."'0 4 In
96 Edmonson v. Simon, 86 F.R.D. 375, 382-83 (N.D.
Ill. 1980).
97 Id.








103 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lord,
585 F.2d 860, 875 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 913 (1979).
104 Lividitis, 963 F.2d at 1017-18.
this case, the plaintiffs were all subject to the
same disciplinary system. The class' lawyers
cunningly claimed that the discrimination
originated from this system. By claiming this
system as the class' common thread, one
member of the proposed class was excluded
by the court because he was not subject to the
system. However, the class allowed by the
court was broad enough to include almost
every other African-American that might have
been discriminated against by the defendant.
Most practitioners surely would find this to be
a success.
The best way to certify a class is to
find an overriding official company policy
that can be alleged as being implemented in a
discriminatory manner. Examples of such
practices include discrimination in
implementation of disciplinary, corporate
advancement, or hiring systems. All
companies have these policies. The key is to
manipulate the facts so that the discrimination
appears to result from the policy.
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